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Abstract
In a unionised economy with supply-side ¯scal policy transparency has two con-
trasting e®ects on economic performance. Uncertainty on central bank's preferences
induces unions to reduce wages but also produces a fully-anticipated expansionary
¯scal policy which favours the setting of higher wages. Even if the net e®ect depends
on the preference parameters of public entities and on the e®ectiveness of ¯scal pol-
icy on aggregate supply: (i) the positive e®ects of opacity in unionised economies
without ¯scal policy are con¯rmed when the central bank is populist; (ii) if it is
instead su±ciently conservative, transparency reduces in°ation and the output gap,
but at the cost of higher macroeconomic volatility.
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11 Introduction
The macroeconomic importance of central bank (CB from now onward) transparency is
increasingly debated in the literature. According to a popular view, progressively sup-
ported by central bankers (Greesnpan, 2001), transparency allows for Pareto-improving
forecasts and decisions (Blinder 1998; Blinder et al. 2001), favours cooperative behaviour
(Bini-Smaghi and Gros 2001) and allows to better anticipate policy responses in the face
of unexpected developments, thus speeding economic adjustments (Ferguson 2002). Ac-
cording to an opposite view, opacity (the opposite of transparency) allows instead CBs
to use their private information strategically (in the sense of Canzoneri 1985), thus in-
ducing wage moderation (Sorensen 1991) and in this way decreasing both the level and
the variance of in°ation (GrÄ uner 2002). Some authors have also tried to demonstrate
that CB's preference uncertainty is welfare enhancing because the reduction it produces
in output variability dominates the higher in°ation variability it brings about (Eij±n-
ger, Hoeberichts and Shaling 2000), but other contributions have reached opposite results
(Beetsma and Jensen 2003). Positions hence remain rather distant, as also shown by the
available surveys on the subject matter (see, e.g., Geerats 2002; Posen 2003; Carpenter
2004).
This lack of convergence in the theoretical literature, which may help explain the
existing di±culties of justifying the heterogeneous behaviour of actual CBs in informa-
tion disclosure (Bini-Smaghi and Gros 2001; Eij±nger and Geraats 2002; Di Bartolomeo
and Marchetti 2004; Demertzis and Hughes-Hallet 2003), is mirrored by the scanty and
con°icting ¯ndings of the empirical literature. In particular, it is not clear whether trans-
parency strongly a®ects the average level of in°ation and of the output gap,1 while it
1For example, Demertzis and Hughes-Hallet (2003) claim that this is not the case for the nine countries
2remains di±cult to establish its e®ects on output and in°ation variability. According to
Chortareas et al. (2003) and to Demertzis and Hughes-Hallet (2003), disclosure reduces
in°ation volatility at the expense of a rise in output volatility, whereas Kuttner and Posen
(1999), (2000), (2001) argue that in°ation targeting CBs display higher °exibility in re-
sponding to shocks without reducing their ability to respond to output volatility. Further
evidence seems to instead suggest that conservative (i.e., anti-in°ationary) and trans-
parent CBs are able to reduce both levels and variances of output and in°ation (Posen
2003).
Since the notion of transparency is not univocal, in this paper we restrict our attention
to the so-called "contingent", or "political", view of transparency (Posen 2003; Hughes-
Hallet and Viegi 2003) - i.e., that related to information asymmetries between CBs and the
general public about the weight of the arguments in the monetary authorities' objective
functions2 - which relates transparency to the CB's degree of conservativeness.3 In this
context, we aim to show that the e®ects of transparency vary with the main institutional
characteristics of the economy: degree of labour market competitiveness, degree of CB's
conservativeness, constraints on ¯scal policy. To this aim, we bring together two modelling
set-ups recently proposed by the literature, that is:
(i) models considering the e®ects of monetary policy transparency in unionised economies
without ¯scal policy, where a reduction in transparency leads to more wage discipline
(as in Sorensen 1991) and thus to lower in°ation and unemployment (GrÄ uner 2002);
(ii) models focussing on a Nash equilibrium between the CB and a government able to
control a ¯scal instrument, with a non unionized private sector acting as Stackelberg
for which Eij±nger and Geraats (2002) constructed their indexes.
2This view originated of course from Barro and Gordon (1983): in order to avoid the suboptimal
outcomes of discretionary monetary policy, authorities should pre-commit to publicly announced policies,
be independent and in°ation averse (Rogo® 1985); in order to be accountable, their behaviour must be
predictable and veri¯able by the public, and to this aim they must disclose the information they possess.
3See, among others, Cukierman (2002), Faust and Svensson (2001), (2002), Geraats (2002), Gersbach
and Hahn (2003), (2004) and Jensen (2002).
3leader with respect to the public sector (Hughes-Hallett and Viegi 2003; Demertzis,
Hughes-Hallett and Viegi 2004).
In our economy with endogenous supply-side ¯scal policy and labour market distor-
tions, the timing of the game (which is solved backward) is as follows: the union sets the
nominal wage, then the government ¯xes the value of the ¯scal instrument, and ¯nally the
CB chooses the value of the monetary instrument. These assumptions encapsulate the
idea that wage contracts are set for a period of time which is longer than the time horizon
of ¯scal policy and, even more, than that of monetary policy. We adopt the sequential
timing because we agree with the view that the Stackelberg equilibrium concept is the
one that better captures ¯scal and monetary interaction (Beetsma and Bovenberg 1998;
Beetsma and Uhlig 1999).4
The main conclusion we reach is that CB's opacity always produces a wage restraint
e®ect in union behaviour: as the cost of uncertainty about CB's preferences increases
with in°ation and unemployment, the traditional result of policy caution a lµ a Brainard
(1967) emerges. However, if ¯scal policy is added to the picture the e®ects of transparency
become more complex. In general, the positive e®ects of opacity documented by GrÄ uner
(2002) are con¯rmed if the CB is populist. Under su±ciently conservative monetary
authorities, transparency reduces in°ation and the output gap, but it generates higher
macroeconomic volatility. Uncertainty on CB's preferences has expansionary e®ects on
¯scal policy which are however anticipated by the union which, by increasing wages,
generates higher in°ation and unemployment. The tension between the wage restraint
e®ect and this anticipation e®ect determines the net impact of opacity on macroeconomic
outcomes. Since this depends on the exogenous preferences of all the players, our results
are consistent with the empirically observed heterogeneity in CB's transparency across
countries.
4See also Dixit and Lambertini (2003) for a general discussion.
4The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we construct a policy game between a
money wage setting union, a ¯scal authority and a CB, and in section 3 we solve it under
a Stackelberg sequence of players' moves. In section 4 we analyze the e®ects of an increase
in CB's transparency on the levels of in°ation and output deviation from the target values,
under di®erent assumptions on the "type" of CB (more or less conservative) and on the
stance of ¯scal policy (¯scal authorities more or less concerned about the losses induced
by ¯scal expansions). Section 5 o®ers some insights on the e®ects of CB's transparency
on the variances of in°ation and output deviation. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we introduce a simple policy game made up by two equations describing the
economy and by three equations describing policymakers' preferences. Aggregate demand
and aggregate supply are:
AD: x = m ¡ p (1)
AS: x = p ¡ w + ´b (2)
where x is the output deviation for its non-distorted natural level, m is the money stock,
p is the price level (in°ation), w is the nominal wage and b is the net level of a supply-side
¯scal policy. Equation (1) is a well-known and simple representation of the demand side.
Equation (2) is the aggregate supply, expressed in terms of the real wage instead of price
expectations, so as to introduce endogenous labour market distortions due to unionized
wage setting. Equation (2) also includes the possibility for ¯scal policy to in°uence the
aggregate supply of output. This idea, which has been increasingly employed in the recent
literature, can be justi¯ed in several di®erent ways.
1. b is a ¯scal surplus (b < 0), or de¯cit (b > 0), which has a permanent e®ect
5on output if maintained through time (Hughes-Hallett and Viegi 2003; Demertzis,
Hughes-Hallett and Viegi 2004). Equation (2) then summarizes the idea that the
aggregate supply of output can be split into a private component, produced by
competitive and pro¯t-maximising ¯rms and a public component, generated by a
government producing the same (aggregate) good produced by private ¯rms and
expanding the level of output by directly purchasing labour through non-monetary
budget de¯cits (Acocella and Ciccarone 1997).
2. b is a public investment that raises the private sector productivity, or a production
subsidy to the ¯rms that raises the supply of goods and services and reduces prices,
and which can be ¯nanced by per-head taxes and/or by taxation on sales or on
income (Dixit and Lambertini 2003).
3. b is a measure of social security or of non-wage costs imposed on employers, or taxes
on labour, or the costs of supply side constraints, or market restrictions, or job
protection legislation imposed on producers (Demertzis, Hughes-Hallett and Viegi
2004).
In any case, monetary policy operates on the demand side and ¯scal policy on the
supply side. We assume that ´ > 0: an increase in b ceteris paribus reduces prices, and
raises output and employment, thus favouring an increase in the nominal wage set by the
union. This set-up is useful, as it enables us: (a) to study the e®ects of transparency on
output and in°ation in a simple model with ¯scal policy, and so to take the government's
preferences (and some institutional constraints, like the European Stability and Growth
Pact) directly into account; (b) to compare our results with those of other models already
present in the literature which take on board the idea that government de¯cit spending
does not in°uence the demand side of the economy.













where E ["] = 0, E ["2] = ¾2
", " 2 [¡1;¯B], and E is the expectation operator. We choose
this speci¯cation because it avoids the arbitrary e®ects of CB's preference uncertainty on
average monetary policy, documented by Beetsma and Jensen (2003), which are produced
by objective functions such as that adopted by GrÄ uner (2002), where a slight change in the
modelling of uncertainty (e.g., the placement of the stochastic term in front of one or the
other argument of the CB's objective function) can lead to radically di®erent e®ects on
average monetary reactions. According to equation (3), the level of uncertainty associated
with CB's preferences is represented by the variance ¾2
". As the random variable " takes
values in a compact set and has an expected value equal to zero, ¾2
" must have a well
de¯ned upper bound; more precisely: ¾2
" 2 [0;¯B] (see the Appendix for details).

















In line with the existing literature (Hughes-Hallett and Viegi 2003; Demertzis, Hughes-
Hallett and Viegi 2004), we do not include an explicit budget constraint into the model,
but constrain ¯scal policy by placing penalties on its use through the introduction of b
in the government's utility function (4), with the parameter 'G measuring the weight
of such penalties. It can be thought of as in°uenced, among other things, by speci¯c
institutional constraints posed on ¯scal policy: when ¯scal discipline becomes tight due,
e.g., to international agreements (as the Stability and Growth Pact), the cost for the
Government to pursue an active ¯scal policy increases, and this can be represented by a
higher level of 'G.
5The Government has expected preferences since it does not know the CB's degree of transparency.
7The justi¯cation for this approach can be split into three steps.
1. It is possible to interpret the government's present value budget constraint (the
liabilities to GDP ratio at time t is equal to the surplus to GDP ratio at time t plus
the expected value of future discounted surplus to GDP ratios) as a condition that
must be satis¯ed in equilibrium. This occurs if ¯scal policy generates a sequence
of future surplus to GDP ratios which satis¯es the condition independently of the
values taken in equilibrium by the discount factors, or the initial liabilities to GDP
ratio. Alternatively, if the sequence of future surplus to GDP ratios is arbitrary, the
discount factors, or the initial liabilities to GDP ratio must move so as to satisfy
the equilibrium condition.
2. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) have shown that if (i) the sequence of surplus
to GDP ratio is determined by the liabilities to GDP ratio (through a positive and
bounded away from zero in¯nitely often time varying response parameter) and a
bounded random variable (encapsulating political and economic factors), and (ii) the
sum of the discount factors converges, then the °ow budget constraint is dynamically
stable, and the government's present value budget constraint is respected for any
initial liabilities to GDP ratio. We do not need the ¯scal response to be strong
enough, but only that the discounted value of the liabilities to GDP ratio at time
t + T goes to zero as T goes to in¯nity. If the response parameter is constant, any
positive value guarantees this result; in the case of a time varying ¯scal response, it
may be arbitrarily small and infrequent.
3. The inclusion of the ¯scal de¯cit (or, more in general, of ¯scal policy) in the gov-
ernment's utility function guarantees that the ¯scal response will be such that the
solutions of the model are both sustainable (i.e., they satisfy the long-run solvency
constraint) and can be ¯nanced in advance (i.e., they satisfy the "cash in advance"
8constraints): the budget constraint does not bind.










The union's loss is increasing in the deviations of actual output (employment) from
the natural level, but is strictly decreasing in the realized value of the real wage. Thus, the
union is willing to trade departures of employment from its market clearing level against
increases in the real wage. This speci¯cation, or variants of it, is common in the literature
concerned with the macroeconomic implications of union wage setting.6 It implies that,
in general, equilibrium will be characterized by employment below the market-clearing
level and it provides, in the present model, the source of a time inconsistency problem.
As already mentioned, the timing of the game is as follows: (i) the union sets w; (ii)
the government ¯xes b; (iii) the CB chooses m. The game is solved backward.
3 Macroeconomic equilibrium
The solution of the CB's problem gives the following reaction function:
m =
¯B ¡ 2" ¡ 1
¯B + 1
(´b ¡ w) (6)
where ¯B is an index of the CB's degree of conservativeness: if ¯B > 1+2" ( ¯B < 1+2")
the CB follows a (non) accommodating policy with respect to wage expansion. It is
worth noticing that if the CB accommodates wage increases, it cannot accommodate
¯scal expansions (i.e., increase m when b increases).
6Properties of linear-quadratic preferences in this kind of policy games are fully discussed in Acocella
and DI Bartolomeo (2004). See also Acocella and Ciccarone (1997).
9Given equation (6), output, in°ation and the real wage can be written as:
w ¡ p = w ¡
1 + "
¯B + 1








(w ¡ ´b) (9)
However, in setting their policy, the government and the union cannot predict these
equations since they are not perfectly informed about the CB's preferences. By using
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The equilibrium value of the de¯cit depends on the variance of " (degree of trans-





























The corresponding equilibrium wage wS is a function of the model parameters: wS =
h













10The equilibrium outcomes are:
¼S = ®
[(1 + ¯G)´2¾2
" + (¯G + ¯2
B)´2 + ¯B (1 + ¯B)'G]
'G (1 + ¯B)(¾2
" + ¯2
B)
(1 + ") (11)
xS = ¡®
[(1 + ¯G)´2¾2
" + (¯G + ¯2
B)´2 + ¯B (1 + ¯B)'G]
'G (1 + ¯B)(¾2
" + ¯2
B)
(¯B ¡ ") (12)
Equations (11)-(12) immediately clarify that, in this context, the issue of transparency
is relevant only if the wage distortion introduced by ® is signi¯cantly high.7 The higher
is ®, the higher are in°ation and unemployment, as in this economy the only distortion
is due to the presence of unions and wage bargaining. At the same time, an increase
in ¯B increases unemployment but decreases in°ation, in line with the traditional view
introduced by Rogo® (1985). Finally, since the e®ects of CB's opacity are either positive
or negative on both unemployment and in°ation, we focus only on the latter variable.
Before analyzing the e®ects of opacity on macroeconomic outcomes it is useful to
brie°y discuss the full transparency case (i.e. ¾2
² = 0). If the Government is inactive,
we face the traditional Barro-Gordon model and the related well-known in°ation bias
problem. By contrast an active Government produces an additional bias: as it attempts
to increase output trough expansionary ¯scal policy, the union raises the nominal wage,
since the marginal cost of output (employment) is lower when ¯scal policy is expansionary.
This wage anticipation e®ect leads to a ¯scal bias: the more the Government is populist
(i.e. ¯G is low), the higher are in°ation and unemployment. In order to mitigate union
claims, a ¯scal policy oriented to stabilizing in°ation is required.
7This is true also for the equilibiurm value of b.
114 Transparency, in°ation and unemployment
After some algebra, it turns out that the e®ect of transparency on the expected level of


















´2 (¯B ¡ 1)
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Since the in°uence of transparency on the output gap goes in the same direction as that
on in°ation (see equations (11), (12)), the ¯rst of conditions (13) says that more opacity





The economic interpretation of condition (13) is straightforward. The e®ects of trans-
parency depends on the ¯scal stance of the Government ('G) relative to its preference
parameter over in°ation (¯G). When the government is active in stabilizing in°ation (i.e.,
for low values of 'G and high values of ¯G), a transparent CB reduces average in°ation and
unemployment; when the government faces a tight ¯scal constraint (i.e., for high values
of 'G), an opaque CB will be associated with lower average in°ation and unemployment.8
The rationale of the result summarized by inequalities (13) can be explained by
Brainard's (1967) approach to uncertainty: as uncertainty increases so do the expected
marginal gains associated with more expansionary ¯scal policies and with wage restraints.
On the other hand, the wage is raised by the union anticipating larger ¯scal de¯cits. Thus,
the more the government is active (a low 'G), the more the anticipation e®ect of expan-
sionary ¯scal policy tends to o®set the wage restraint e®ect due to uncertainty. Also ¯B
and ¯G a®ect the wage anticipation e®ect: the Government responds to uncertainty more
(or less) strongly according to the size of these two parameters. In particular, the role
8In a traditional Barro-Gordon model augmented with preference uncertainty, higher opacity implies
lower average in°ation and unemployment. This result can be easily veri¯ed by considering 'G ! 1






12played by CB's conservativeness should be highlighted. According to (13), when the union
and the Government expect to face a populist CB on average (i.e. when ¯B < 1), more
opacity always implies a reduction in average in°ation and in the output gap. Summing
up, inequalities (13) derive from the interaction between:
(UN): the uncertainty e®ects on wage and ¯scal policy and
(WA): the wage anticipation of ¯scal policy.
The relative size of the UN and WA e®ects determines the ¯nal impact of ¾2
" on the
macroeconomic equilibrium (xS;¼S). As for the UN e®ect, greater uncertainty leads
to wage moderation and more expansionary ¯scal policy, i.e., more prudent policies
(Brainard's principle). As far as ¯scal policy is concerned, the UN e®ect can be eas-
ily observed by considering the Government's reaction function (10); the elasticity of b to
an increase in ¾2








'G (1 + ¯B)
2 (1 + ¯G)¾2
"
´2 [¯G + ¯2
B + (1 + ¯G)¾2
"]
2 + [¯G + ¯2
B + (1 + ¯G)¾2
"]'G (1 + ¯B)
2 > 0
The "moderation" e®ect of greater uncertainty on wS cannot be checked in the same way,
as it incorporates the other players' best responses. Yet, when the Government is inactive
('G ! 1) the optimal response by the union collapses to:
wS(:G) =





In this case, the only mechanism at work is a "wage moderation e®ect" (analogous to
that of GrÄ uner 2002):
dwS(:G)
d¾2
" < 0. As for the WA e®ect, more expansionary ¯scal policy
stimulates a wage increase because it reduces its marginal cost (in terms of employment)
for the union.
9More uncertainty does not imply in general a greater bS, since it increases with uncertainty given the
nominal wage, which is however an endogenous variable.
13Thus, the UN and the WA e®ects go in the opposite direction and their relative
importance determines the sign of the ¯nal impact of greater uncertainty on the macro-
economic equilibrium. The net result between UN and WA is summarized by inequalities
(13). The relative strength of the two e®ects depends upon the ratio 'G=¯G: a low value
(an active Government concerned with in°ation) means a reduced UN e®ect; the WA
e®ect then prevails, inducing the union to rise the wage. The opposite happens (the
moderation e®ect prevails) when 'G=¯G is high enough, i.e., when the Government is
inactive/populist.
Finally, consider the role played by CB's conservatorism. According to (13), when the
union and the Government expect to face a populist CB on average (i.e. when ¯B < 1),
greater opacity always implies a reduction in average in°ation (and in the output gap),
but the e®ects of wage moderation due to opacity are weak, since the expected marginal
bene¯t (for the union) of such behaviour are small. Under a populist CB, in°ation tends
to be high and the output gap low. The cost of reducing expected loss variability by
wage restraint is high: wage reduction becomes more costly as the output gap gets closer
to zero.10 In this situation, wage e®ects are small relative to ¯scal policy, and the ¯scal
expansion due to uncertainty prevails in determining the e®ects of opacity on in°ation
and the output gap. Summing up, if the CB is populist, b increases while the wage
may increase or decrease, but the e®ect of the former always prevails on the latter. This
explains why in°ation and the output gap fall with opacity.
5 Transparency and macroeconomic instability.
In order to fully evaluate the impact of transparency in economic performance, it is also
necessary to study its impact on the economy's volatility, here synthesized by the variances
10The union's preferences imply second-order losses in output gap/real wage; furthermore, a zero output
gap is not optimal for the union.
14of the equilibrium levels of xS and ¼S.





" + (¯G + ¯2
B)´2 + ¯B (1 + ¯B)'G]
2
'2







As the e®ect of ¾2
" on the variances of xS and ¼S is the same, equation (14) accounts
in an unambiguous way for the impact of opacity on macroeconomic volatility. We can
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> 0
Equations (14) and (15) suggest two remarks. First, as ¾2
" approaches zero, also the
macroeconomic volatility, ¾2
x;¼, tends to disappear; this is straightforward, as the only
source of uncertainty in the model is the one related to the CB's preferences. Were
the levels of ¼S and ¡xS always increasing in opacity, there would be no real trade-o®
between equilibrium levels and volatility with respect to the degree of transparency: the
most desirable situation would be to have a fully transparent CB (¾2
" = 0). But, as shown
in section 4, the response @¼=@¾2
" (and, equally @¼=@¾2
") can be either negative or positive
according to parameter values. If @¼=@¾2
" < 0 and @¾2
¼;x=@¾2
" > 0, there exists a trade
o® between variances and levels: an increase in opacity would yield lower equilibrium
in°ation (and output gap), but it would also imply greater macroeconomic instability.
Second, the sign of (15) depends on the sign of the parabola £1(¾2
")2 +£2¾2
" +£3. As
£1;£3 > 0, @¾2
¼;x=@¾2
" is positive for a large set of parameter values. A su±cient condition
15to have @¾2
¼;x=@¾2
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Condition (16) di®ers from the ¯rst of inequalities (13). The latter says that when ¯B
is greater than one and 'G is relatively low, ¼S increases with opacity (an opposite e®ect
to that highlighted by GrÄ uner 2002). According to condition (16), the same parameter
values would also bring about an increase in macroeconomic volatility. In such case there
would not be a trade o® between levels and variances.
A crucial parameter in condition (16) is ¯B; a numerical example shows that when ¯B
is high enough - even if lower than 1 - then ¾2
¼;x monotonically increases with opacity; in
order to have a more complex behaviour of macroeconomic volatility, a rather low value
of ¯B is needed (see Figure 1).
This result extends that obtained by GrÄ uner (2002), who envisages a non-monotonic
relationship between opacity and macroeconomic volatility: ¾2
¼ increases with ¾2
" for low
values of CB's preference uncertainty, and then decreases after reaching a maximum. In
our model this occurs when the CB is strongly populist on average (¯B is small enough),
but a positive monotone relationship between ¾2
¼ and ¾2
" arises when the CB's is conser-
vative (or mildly populist).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we developed a model of CB's transparency in a unionized economy with
endogenous ¯scal policy. In this economy, opacity always produces a wage restraint e®ect
in union behaviour, as the cost of uncertainty about CB's preferences increases with









































Figure 1: Macroeconomic volatility ¾2
x;¼ as a function of opacity ¾2
², for two di®erent
parameterisations: A) ¯B = ® = ´ = 'G = 1:5; ¯G = 0:5; and B) ¯B = 0:25; ® = ´ =
'G = 1:5, ¯G = 0:5. Note that for both parameterizations it is @¼
@¾2
" < 0, thus in both
cases there exists a trade o® between levels and variance. Under parameterization B),
¾2
¼;x is increasing in opacity for low values of the latter, and reaches a maximum when ¾2
"
is equal to 0:068.
in°ation and unemployment. However, this source of uncertainty has also an expansionary
e®ect on ¯scal policy which is however anticipated by the union, leading to increased wages
and thus to higher in°ation and unemployment.
The tension between the wage restraint e®ect and the anticipation e®ect determines
the net impact of opacity on macroeconomic equilibrium. The relative strength of the two
factors depends on the ¯scal stance of the Government relative to its degree of in°ation
aversion. When the Government is active and concerned with in°ation, the wage antici-
pation e®ect prevails, inducing the union to rise the wage; in this case, a transparent CB
reduces average in°ation and unemployment. When a populist government faces a tight
¯scal constraint, the moderation e®ect prevails and an opaque CB brings about lower
average in°ation and unemployment. The role played by CB's conservatorism is also rel-
evant. When the union and the Government expect to face a populist CB on average,
the wage restraint e®ect is weak relative to ¯scal expansion, and greater opacity implies
a reduction in average in°ation and in the output gap.
17As CB's opacity is the only source of uncertainty, macroeconomic volatility disappears
with full transparency, and increases, in general, with opacity. This relationship is however
humped-shaped when the CB is strongly populist.
Our analysis quali¯es the results documented by GrÄ uner (2002). When ¯scal pol-
icy is considered, the positive e®ects of opacity on macroeconomic outcomes and the
non-monotonic relationship between opacity and macroeconomic volatility occur if the
CB is strongly populist on average. If the CB is su±ciently conservative, transparency
can instead reduce in°ation and the output gap, but it generates higher macroeconomic
volatility.
Appendix
The problem of characterizing the moments of a generic random variable subject to speci¯c
constraints (e.g., to take values in a compact set, or else) has been extensively debated in
mathematical statistics (see, e.g., Kemperman 1968).
Although a general demonstration is out of the scope of the paper, a sketchy argument
can help to grasp the general idea of why ¾2
" has an upper bound which is equal or lower
than ¯B. The probability distribution of " ensuring the highest variance is the one that
assigns positive probability values to the extrema of ", ¡1 and ¯B, and zero elsewhere,
according to the following chart:
" ! ("1 = ¡1) » p (probability of ¡1)
&
("2 = ¯B) » 1 ¡ p (probability of ¯B)
The distribution p is subject to the following constraint on the expected value:
18E(") = p(¡1) + (1 ¡ p)¯B = 0






" = E(" ¡ 0)
2 = p + (1 ¡ p)¯
2
B
s.t. (1 ¡ p)¯B ¡ p = 0
From the ¯rst order conditions it is immediate to obtain: pmax =
¯B
1+¯B. It follows that
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